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Access to Preliminary Hearings:
Is California's Closure Law
Unconstitutional?
By JANICE FUHRMAN*
For the past several years courts around the country have re-
ceived an increasing number of requests from criminal defendants
to close pre-trial and trial proceedings to the public.' As a result,
California courts are facing a growing dilemma involving a century-
old statute, Penal Code section 868, which, if invoked, affords ab-
solute protection to a criminal defendant against press coverage
and public scrutiny of his preliminary hearing.'
Some other states, such as Virginia, leave the decision to close
the proceedings to the judge's discretion.3 But California's statute
has been interpreted since 1960 to mandate closure upon request,
giving the presiding judge no individual choice.' Though rarely in-
voked in the past 100 years,5 and even then mainly for privacy rea-
sons when criminal defendants were charged with sex crimes,* sec-
tion 868's new importance in the California courts7 is significant
because it affects the constitutional rights and interests of the
press, the public, and the criminal defendant. Several other states
* Member, Third Year Class
1. Court Watch Summary, THE NEws MEDIA AND THE LAW, Oct./Nov. 1980, at 34 (listing
300 efforts to close criminal justice proceedings from July 1979 to Oct. 1980).
2. The Recorder, Dec. 18, 1980, at 1, col. 5.
3. VA. CODE §19.2-266 provides in pertinent part: "In the trial of all criminal cases,
whether the same be felony or misdemeanor cases, the court may, in its discretion, exclude
from the trial any persons whose presence would impair the conduct of a fair trial, provided
the right of the accused to a public trial shall not be violated."
4. See People v. Elliot, 54 Cal. 2d 498, 354 P.2d 225, 6 Cal. Rptr. 753 (1960).
5. The Recorder, Dec. 18, 1980, at 1, col. 1. See also Geis, Preliminary Hearings and the
Press, 8 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 397, 407 (1961), which states that provisions such as section 868
are recognized as "unique" and in most cases were kept until 1960 "in judicial dormancy"
and "day-to-day disuse."
6. Graham & Letwin, The Preliminary Hearing in Los Angeles, 18 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 635,
656-57 (1971).
7. The Recorder, Dec. 18, 1980, at 1, col. 5.
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have provisions similar to California's section 868,8 sinc6 they too
utilized the original New York Field Code of Criminal Procedure,
which became the statutory basis for criminal procedure laws in
many jurisdictions. Thus, any California or U.S. Supreme Court
decision about the constitutionality of section 868 will have poten-
tially far-reaching effects.
Challenges to the constitutionality of statutes which mandate
closure at a defendant's request are based on grounds that such
statutes violate fundamental constitutional rights of the public and
overzealously protect the rights of criminal defendants. Arguments
against section 868 focus on the freedom of speech and press guar-
antees in both the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and
article I, section 2 of the California Constitution; on the press'
need to gather information effectively to carry out its news-dissem-
inating function; and on both the press and public interest in re-
view and scrutiny of portions of criminal proceedings. Arguments
for the statute are essentially two-fold: first, the defendant has a
constitutional right to a fair trial before an impartial jury which
has not been exposed to damaging and possibly inaccurate news
reports regarding the defendant's role in the crime being consid-
ered; and second, defendants may have reputations at stake. If
criminal charges brought against a defendant are dropped after a
preliminary hearing, the publicity generated as a result of press
access to the hearing can be quite damaging to the defendant, even
though he is not in fact prosecuted for the crime charged.
Although many California trial court judges have recently ruled
section 868 unconstitutional,9 there has been no published appel-
late decision on the subject of its constitutionality since 1960.10
8. See Gannett v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 391 n.23 (1979) (listing Arizona, Idaho, Cali-
fornia, Iowa, Montana, Nevada, North Dakota and Utah as those states still using Field
Code-derived statutes).
9. See People v. Moore, No. 143646 (Oakland Mun. Ct., Piedmont Jud. Dist., filed Dec.
20, 1978); People v. Brown, No. 146597 (Oakland Mun. Ct., Piedmont Jud. Dist., filed Feb.
13, 1979); People v. Brooks, No. 74625 (Berkeley Mun. Ct., Albany Jud. Dist., filed Jun. 18,
1979); People v. Monica, No. A-353771 (Los Angeles Mun. Ct., Los Angeles Jud. Dist., filed
Oct. 30, 1979); People v. Monty, No. A-142369 (Los Angeles Mun. Ct., Van Nuys Jud. Dist.,
filed Jan. 4, 1979); People v. Escarcega, No. A-349035 (Los Angeles Mun. Ct., Los Angeles
Jud. Dist., filed April 10, 1979).
10. See 54 Cal. 2d 498, 354 P.2d 225, 6 Cal. Rptr. 753 (1960). The preliminary hearing in
People v. Monica, supra note 9, was ordered closed by the Court of Appeal for the Second
Appellate District, Division Four, in an unpublished opinion issuing a preliminary writ of
mandate. A petition for hearing was denied by the California Supreme Court in the case of
Tribune Publishing v. Schwartz, 1 Civ. 4726 (1st Dist. Ct. App., Div. 3, filed Feb. 9, 1980),
and the appeal in United Press International v. Justice Court, 1 Civ. 49271 (1st Dist. Ct.
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The California Supreme Court, however, has recently heard a case
in which the statute is being challenged by the media on First
Amendment grounds," likely because of the current statewide con-
troversy over section 868.12
This note examines the purpose and effect of Penal Code section
868, including how it is invoked and what rights flow to the defen-
dant from its invocation. A discussion and analysis of the First
Amendment press issues, involving a right of access to judicial pro-
ceedings, and the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a fair trial by an
impartial jury is also included. In addition, modifications to the
current statute are suggested and discussion of a "model statute,"
one without the rigid and mandatory stance of section 868, is rec-
ommended. Finally, a conclusion is drawn from analysis of the
competing rights and interests involved: specifically, that the de-
fendant's fair trial right, a fundamental one deserving substantial
protection, can be adequately safeguarded in many, though per-
haps not all, cases, through judicial mechanisms other than closure
of the preliminary hearing.
I
The Statutory Framework of Section 868
Enacted in 1872 and based on the New York Code of Criminal
Procedure and the Criminal Practice Act,13 section 868 requires
that upon motion of the defendant, a preliminary hearing in a
criminal trial be conducted in secret.
Though legislative history of the statute is scant, the California
Supreme Court recently took note that in 1872 the Penal Code
App., Div. 4, filed. Mar. 20, 1980) was dismissed.
11. San Jose Mercury News v. Municipal Court, No. SF-24253 (Sup. Ct. Cal., filed Dec. 1,
1980).
12. In addition to the judicial controversy, there have also been repeated attempts to
repeal or amend section 868 in the California legislature. Currently Assemblywoman Carol
Hallett of Atascadero is "leading the recurring legislative battle over the issue." Closed
Hearing Law Challenged Again, The Recorder, Dec. 18, 1980, at 1, col. 5. Hallett's bill
would remove "all statutory authority for closure of preliminary hearings, according to legal
experts." Id.
13. Section 161 of the Criminal Practice Act, enacted by the California Legislature in
1851, reads as follows:
The Magistrate shall also upon the request of the defendant exclude from the
examination of every person except his clerk, the prosecutor and his counsel, the
Attorney General, the District Attorney of the County, the defendant and his
counsel, and the officer having the defendant in custody.
Cal. Stats. 1851, ch. 29, § 161, at 229.
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commissioners stated:
The object of this section [8681 is to carry out more fully the
spirit of Sec. 867. The policy of this statute has always been to
prevent the concocting of a charge against the defendant upon
collusive or false testimony. The magistrate, with this view, may
exclude witnesses while another witness is under examination.
The object of that provision might be wholly defeated if, though
not present, one witness might be informed of the testimony of
another by persons who are present. Another advantage may re-
sult from this section. If the examination is necessarily public, the
testimony will be spread before the community, and a state of
opinion may be created which will render it difficult to obtain an
unprejudiced jury.14
According to the statute, after section 868 has been invoked, the
preliminary hearing is open to only the judge, his clerk, the court
reporter, the bailiff, the prosecutor, the defendant and his counsel,
the Attorney General, and a handful of other officers of the court."
Most of those allowed in the courtroom during a closed prelimi-
nary hearing were not originally listed in the statute; their pres-
ence was provided for in later amendments."
A. Purposes of Section 868
The leading opinion on section 868, People v. Elliot,1 7 states that
a major purpose of the statute is to give the criminal defendant an
"absolute" right to an impartial jury trial by preventing the pre-
trial dissemination of testimony at the preliminary hearing, either
14. People v. Pompa-Ortiz, 27 Cal. 3d 519, 524-25, 165 Cal. Rptr. 851, 854, 612 P.2d 941,
944 (1980).
15. CAL. PENAL CODE § 868 (West) states:
The magistrate must also, upon the request of the defendant, exclude from the
examination every person except his clerk, court reporter and bailiff, the prosecu-
tor and his counsel, the Attorney General, the district attorney of the county, the
investigating officer, the officer having custody of a prisoner witness while the
prisoner is testifying, the defendant and his counsel, and the officer having the
defendant in custody; provided, however, that a prosecuting witness may, in the
discretion of the court, be entitled for moral support to the attendance of one
person of his or her own choosing otherwise not a witness. The person so chosen
shall not discussprior to or during the preliminary hearing the testimony of the
prosecuting witness with any person, other than the prosecuting witness, who is a
witness in the examination. Nothing in this section shall affect the right to ex-
clude witnesses as provided in section 867 of the Penal Code.
16. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 868 (Deering) legislative history summary; Cal. Stats. 1851,
ch. 29, § 161, at 229; Cal. Stats. 1871-72, ch. 371, § 1, at 528.
17. 54 Cal. 2d 498, 354 P.2d 225, 6 Cal. Rptr. 753 (1960).
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by newspapers or other media." The court stated that the right to
trial by an impartial jury is an inalienable part of the jury-trial
right, and that it may be substantially impaired if the protection
afforded by section 868 is denied.19 The court in People v. Duck-
ett20 announced another purpose of section 868, using the Elliot
case as stare decisis. Quoting Elliot, the court stated, "Section 868
provides a substantial and often indispensable protection to the
person who is unjustifiably accused of a criminal offense. The
Legislature has specifically conferred upon an accused the right to
protect his name from being maligned at a preliminary
examination."2
B. Requirements for Making the Section 868
Motion
The defendant's right to exclude unauthorized persons from the
courtroom during the preliminary hearing may be waived if not
specifically requested, and it must be presented "in an intelligent
and legally sufficient manner."2 Such a motion is sufficient where
section 868 is expressly mentioned and a request is made that "all
persons" be excluded from the courtroom. When the defendant
does not specifically state that his exclusion motion is made pursu-
ant to section 868, the court's failure to exclude an investigating
officer is not reversible error. 4
Where a defendant requests that "all witnesses" be excluded
from the preliminary hearing and mentions no applicable statute,
courts have presumed that the request was made under Penal
Code section 867, which provides that no witness in a trial shall
be present in a courtroom for the testimony of any other. In such a
situation, the defendant may not later complain that the motion
was made pursuant to section 868." Unless a defendant makes his
request for exclusion of unauthorized persons from his preliminary
18. Id. at 504.
19. Id.
20. 210 Cal. App. 2d 867, 26 Cal. Rptr. 926 (1962).
21. Id. at 870.
22. People v. Brown, 200 Cal. App. 2d 111, 115, 19 Cal. Rptr. 36, 38 (1962).
23. See McGonagill v. Superior Court, 214 Cal. App. 2d 192, 195, 29 Cal. Rptr. 485, 487
(1963).
24. See People v. Lopez, 60 Cal. 2d 223, 384 P.2d 16, 32 Cal. Rptr. 424, (1963).
25. CAL. PENAL CODE § 867 (West).
26. See People v. Bookout, 197 Cal. App. 2d 457, 17 Cal. Rptr. 213 (1961); People v. Guy,
191 Cal. App. 2d 714, 13 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1961).
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hearing in the required manner, his right of exclusion is waived
and the presence at the hearing of persons who might have been
excluded under the statute does not affect the validity of the
proceeding.17
C. Requirements for Timely Objections
A timely objection is required when the court fails to remove
persons from the courtroom after a defendant's motion to exclude
"any witness," or "any unauthorized person" from the preliminary
hearing. A defendant's failure to object has been held to constitute
a waiver of the objection." Where a defendant's motion mentions
the exclusion of "witnesses," but not other unauthorized persons,
pursuant to section 868, it has been held that the trial court's ex-
clusion of witnesses alone must be immediately objected to by the
defendant, to clarify whether the persons meant to be excluded by
the defendant have been removed.
When a defendant in a preliminary examination ignores errors of
the trial court relating to section 868, he may not wait until after
his conviction and then raise objections for the first time on ap-
peal.30 When an unauthorized investigating officer was allowed to
remain in the courtroom after the defendant requested the court-
room be cleared, a California court of appeal held the defendant
should have expressed his dissatisfaction with the court's ruling at
the time it was made. The court said it was incumbent upon the
defendant to pursue the exclusion request at every stage of the
proceeding.-"
D. Section 868 is a Mandatory Closure Statute
A defendant invoking the protections of section 868 need not
give a reason for doing so. No showing that an open hearing might
or would prejudice the defendant is required. The presiding judge
need not balance the defendant's rights to a fair trial against the
public's interest in attending criminal proceedings. The California
Supreme Court in People v. Elliot" ruled that section 868 is
27. See People v. Brown, 200 Cal. App. 2d 111, 115, 19 Cal. Rptr. 36, 38-39 (1962).
28. See People v. Guy, 191 Cal. App. 2d 714, 719, 13 Cal. Rptr. 17, 19 (1961).
29. Id.
30. See People v. Elliot, 54 Cal. 2d 498, 505, 354 P.2d 225, 230, 6 Cal. Rptr. 753, 758
(1960).
31. People v. Griffin, 195 Cal. App. 2d 855, 857, 16 Cal. Rptr. 388, 389 (1961).
32. 54 Cal. 2d 498, 354 P.2d 225, 6 Cal. Rptr. 753 (1960).
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mandatory and that the presiding judge may exercise no discretion
once a defendant makes a proper section 868 motion:
The right afforded to a defendant by Section 868 of the Penal
Code, to require that all unauthorized persons be excluded from
the courtroom during the preliminary examination is a substan-
tial safeguard which cannot be ignored by the magistrate. The
section is mandatory . . . [and] gives the defendant an absolute
right to protect himself against the presence of unauthorized per-
sons at his preliminary examination.38
Further, prejudice is presumed if, at the defendant's section 868
request, all unauthorized persons are not excluded from the court-
room. Under these circumstances, a holding of reversible error
used to be called for automatically. However, the California Su-
preme Court in People.v. Pompa-Ortiz" overruled the reversible
error holding of several early cases, declaring that irregularities in
the preliminary hearing shall be reviewed "under the appropriate
standard of prejudicial error and shall require reversal only if de-
fendant can show that he was deprived of a fair trial or otherwise
suffered prejudice as a result of the error at the preliminary
examination."3 5
E. Section 868 Applies Only to Preliminary
Hearings
Penal Code section 868 has been held to apply exclusively to
preliminary examinations of criminal defendants and never to
criminal trials. In one case, a defendant was charged with perform-
ing lewd acts with children. He argued that testimony at trial by a
child who said she had sexual contact with him was inadmissible,
because it was given in the presence of the child's mother over his
objections, thereby violating section 868. The court held that the
statute, invoked by the defendant at his preliminary hearing, did
not apply to the trial portion of the judicial proceedings against
the defendant." Nowhere in the language of section 868 is there
any indication that the mandatory exclusion of unauthorized per-
sons relates to any proceeding but the preliminary examination.
33. Id. at 757.
34. 27 Cal. 3d 519, 612 P.2d 941, 165 Cal. Rptr. 851 (1980).
35. Id. at 529.'
36. People v. Hanson, 197 Cal. App. 2d 658, 665, 17 Cal. Rptr. 334, 338 (1961).
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F. People v. Elliot
The only significant appellate case involving Penal Code section
868 was People v. Elliot,37 in which the defendant, Barbara Jean
Elliot, was charged with sexual perversion." She requested that
her preliminary hearing be closed under section 868. Until the past
several years, the majority of criminal defendants who invoked the
statute were charged with offenses under Penal Code section 288
- all sexual perversion counts. 9
In Elliot, the defendant was charged with performing lewd acts
with a minor. She asked the presiding judge to remove all persons
from the courtroom pursuant to section 868. This was done, but a
short time later a newspaper reporter entered the courtroom, and,
over the defendant's repeated objections, was allowed to remain for
the entire proceeding. The defendant later moved to set aside the
information on the grounds that she was not legally bound over for
trial because of the section 868 violation. Her motion was denied,
and she was tried and convicted. On appeal, the judgment was re-
versed. The court held that the defendant need not show actual
prejudice stemming from the denial of her section 868 rights; mere
failure to obey the requirements of the statute constituted revers-
ible error. Notably, the court made no mention of any interest the
public might have had in attending the pretrial proceedings.
Recently, criminal defendants' reasons for invoking section 868
have more often been grounded on the potential for damaging pre-
trial publicity,'o than the right to privacy. Use of the statute has
also increased markedly."' These two trends have given rise to a
controversy in the California criminal courts over seemingly con-
flicting constitutional rights: the criminal defendant's right to a
fair trial by an impartial jury versus the interests of the public and
press in gaining access to judicial proceedings involving criminal
37. 54 Cal. 2d 498, 354 P.2d 225, 6 Cal. Rptr. 753 (1960).
38. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 288(a) (West).
39. See People v. Hanson, 197 Cal. App. 2d 658, 17 Cal. Rptr. 334 (1961); People v.
Blanco, 170 Cal. App. 2d 758, 339 P.2d 906 (1959); People v. Guy, 191 Cal. App. 2d 714, 18
Cal. Rptr. 17 (1961).
40. Borow & Kruth, Closed Preliminary Hearings: The Constitutionality of Penal Code
Section 868 in the Aftermath of Gannett v. DePasquale, 55 CALIF. ST. B.J. 18, 19 (1980).
41. Since July 1979, the Wall Street Journal reported "an alarming increase, call it an
epidemic . . . in requests to close judicial criminal proceedings-pretrial hearings, trials,
and post-trial proceedings." Cony, The Growth of Secret Trials, Wall St. J., Dec. 17, 1979,
at 6, col. 5. See also Kang, Preliminary Hearings-New Battleground for Press, S.F. Exam-
iner, Apr. 25, 1980, at 1. col. 4.
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charges.
II
Constitutional Status of Access
Courts have long recognized as logically necessary to the First
Amendment right of the press to disseminate news the antecedent
need to gather it."'
In Houchins v. KQED,"s a majority of the U.S. Supreme Court
recognized that the press needs access to sources of news and that
there is First Amendment protection for the news-gathering pro-
cess. "That the First Amendment speaks separately of freedom of
speech and press is no constitutional accident, but an acknowl-
edgement of the critical role played by the press in American soci-
ety. The Constitution requires sensitivity to that role, and to the
special needs of the press in performing it effectively." 4
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution states
"Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press . . ."; and the California Constitution, in article I,
section 2, provides an even stricter standard for protection of press
and speech rights: "a law may not restrain or abridge liberty of
speech or press.""
The ability to gather information is essential to the free press
dissemination function enunciated in both the federal and Califor-
nia constitutions." Because of the First Amendment protection
given news-gathering, it can be argued that the right to attend
some pretrial criminal proceedings flows from the First Amend-
ment right of a free press, since attendance at such hearings serves
to enhance the press' ability to communicate news to the public,
42. See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 32 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("[ilnformation gathering is entitled to some measure of constitutional protection . . . not
for the private benefit of those who qualify as representatives of the press, but to insure that
the citizens are fully informed regarding matters of public interest"); Pell v. Procunier, 417
U.S. 817 (1974); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); Note, Right of the Press to
Gather Information, 71 COLUm. L. REV. 838 (1971).
43. 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
44. Id. at 16-17.
45. "A protective provision more definitive and inclusive than the First Amendment is
contained in our constitutional guarantee of the right of free speech and press." Robins v.
Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 908, 592 P.2d 341, 346, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854, 859
(1979).
46. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972).
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thereby increasing public awareness of the criminal process.41 In-
deed, without some constitutional protection for the right to gather
news, the protections afforded the press by the First Amendment
and the California Constitution would be rendered almost mean-
ingless.48 Lower federal and state courts have also recognized the
constitutional status of access to sources of news for the press."
Justice Stewart's dissenting opinion in Branzburg v. Hayes co-
gently sums up this concern for accessibility. "No less important to
the news dissemination process is the gathering of information.
News must not be unnecessarily cut off at its source, for without
freedom to acquire information the right to publish would be im-
permissibly compromised. Accordingly, a right to gather news, of
some dimensions, must exist."50
The existence of a general right of access is yet to be deter-
mined, but the U.S. Supreme Court has recently ruled that the
right of the public and press to attend criminal trials-a right
well-recognized in history-is guaranteed under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments." Absent findings which indicate that an
overriding interest of the accused exists, the Court ruled a criminal
trial must be open to the public. The Court did not explain what
might constitute such an overriding concern.
Whether this constitutional mandate of public accessibility to
47. Madsen, The Right to Attend Criminal Hearings, 78 COLUm. L. REV. 1308 (1978). See
also, Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
48., See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972). "Nor is it suggested that news-
gathering does not qualify for First Amendment protection; without some protection for
seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated."
49. See CBS Inc. v. Young, 522 F.2d 234, 238 (6th Cir. 1975) ("[nlews gathering thus
qualifies for First Amendment protections"); U.S. v. Liddy, 478 F.2d 586, 587 (1972); Baker
v. F & F Investment, 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972); U.S. v. Kobli, 172 F.2d 919, 924 (3d Cir.
1949) ("[rlight thus to be accorded to members of the public to be present at criminal trials
is embedded in the Constitution as an important safeguard not only to the accused but to
the public generally"); Borreca v. Fasi, 369 F. Supp. 906, 908-09 (D. Haw. 1974); Lewis v.
Baxley, 368 F. Supp. 768, 775 (N.D. Ala. 1973) ("[iut is apparent that the First Amendment
right to publish must logically include to some degree a right to gather news fit for publica-
tion"); Kovach v. Maddux, 238 F. Supp. 835 (M.D. Tenn. 1965).
The Ohio Supreme Court in State ex rel. Dayton Newspapers, Inc. v. Phillips, 351 N.E.2d
127, 136 (1976), noted that when criminal proceedings are closed, even though the media are
supplied with a cold record of the proceedings, news becomes merely history. "[A] transcript
of a proceeding is a sterile substitute for observing the actual conduct of a hearing, as re-
viewing courts are well aware. Actual observation of the demeanor, voice and gestures of the
participants in a hearing must be as informative to the press and public as those same
matters are to juries during a trial."
50. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 728 (1972).
51. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 100 S. Ct. 2814 (1980).
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criminal trials extends to preliminary hearings is an open question.
While Richmond Newspapers Inc. v. Virginia does not address the
issue, the Court one year earlier in Gannett v. DePasquale"5 noted
that "pretrial proceedings . . . were never characterized by the
same degree of openness as were actual trials," and that there was
never a common law right of access to pretrial proceedings.53
Indeed, the Court stressed the particular need to avoid publicity
at pretrial suppression proceedings. "Publicity concerning pretrial
suppression hearings . . . poses special risks of unfairness. The
whole purpose of such hearings is to screen out unreliable or ille-
gally obtained evidence and insure that this does not become
known to the jury . . . . When such information is publicized dur-
ing a pretrial proceeding, however, it may never be altogether kept
from potential jurors." 4 While this is a strong argument when ap-
plied to the issue of public access to pretrial suppression hearings,
it has less force in the preliminary hearing context, since the pur-
poses of those hearings do not include the admissibility of illegally
obtained evidence.5 5
In Gannett, the Supreme Court supported the trial judge's bal-
ancing of the accused's right to a fair trial against the First
Amendment interest in an open hearing. This is different from sec-
tion 868, in which no balancing is suggested or allowed. The Court
in Gannett held that even if the First Amendment afforded the
press and public a right of access to the hearing, this right had
been sufficiently considered by the trial court since it weighed the
conflicting interests before concluding that the First Amendment
interest in access was overborne by the danger posed to a fair trial
for the defendant.5'
In holding that the Constitution provides no affirmative right of
access to the pretrial suppression hearing at issue, Justice Stewart
wrote, "But we are not here asked . . . whether there would be a
constitutional barrier to a state law that imposed a stricter stan-
dard of closure than the one here employed by the New York
courts."57 Clearly, Penal Code section 868 provides a stricter stan-
52. Gannett v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979), concerned the closure of a pretrial sup-
pression hearing, not a preliminary hearing.
53. Id. at 387-88.
54. Id. at 378.
55. See text under section IV of this note, "Access Extended to Preliminary Hearings,"
infra.
56. Id. at 392-93.
57. Id. at 393-94.
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dard of closure. Merely at the defendant's request, with no oppor-
tunity for the presiding judge to balance the opposing rights and
interests of the parties, or to consider less drastic means or alter-
native measures for protecting the defendant's right to a fair trial,
section 868 allows the preliminary hearing to be closed. The press
and public are shut out of a judicial proceeding which often consti-
tutes a significant aspect of the criminal justice system at work.
III
The Arguments
A. The Media Challenges
Television, radio and print media make frequent objections to
the invocation of section 868 by defendants in cases they consider
newsworthy. Such objections are often made in the context of mul-
tiple murder cases" involving defendants accused of killing mem-
bers of the communities served by the media objectors. In these
situations, the media representatives argue that members of the
public have a vital interest in knowing about and witnessing crimi-
nal judicial proceedings against those defendants who, in many
cases, have terrorized their communities. The representatives con-
clude that they must be given a right of access to such proceedings
to keep the public informed and to maintain public confidence in
the judicial system." This right of access, they insist, must include
access to the preliminary hearing because it is a significant stage in
the adversarial proceedings, since the state-in the name of the
"people"-seeks to establish a case against the defendant.
Media representatives maintain that the constitutionality of sec-
tion 868 should be determined to end the uncertainty which now
plagues the lower state courts. Because of the restrictive nature of
the statute, several trial courts have recently held it to be uncon-
stitutional,"0 and have permitted access to preliminary hearings
58. See People v. Buono, No. A-354231 (Los Angeles Mun. Ct., Los Angeles Jud. Dist.,
filed Dec. 16, 1979). Section 868 was also used to close the preliminary hearing in the mur-
der case of former San Francisco Supervisor Dan White, who was convicted of assassinating
San Francisco's Mayor George Moscone and Supervisor Harvey Milk. High Court Refuses to
Review Century-Old Closure Statute, THE NEWS MEDIA AND THE LAW, Aug./Sept. 1980, at
10.
59. See text accompanying notes 74-78, infra.
60. People v. Moore, No. 143646-A (Oakland Mun. Ct., Piedmont Jud. Dist., filed Dec. 20,
1978); People v. Brown, No. 146597-A (Oakland Mun. Ct., Piedmont Jud. Dist., filed Feb.
13, 1979); People v. Brooks, No. 74625-A (Berkeley Mun. Ct., Albany Jud. Dist., filed June
18, 1979); People v. Monica, No. A-353771 (Los Angeles Mun. Ct., Los Angeles Jud. Dist.,
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over the objections of the defendants. These cases have all later
been reversed on appeal because of the closure motion. For exam-
ple, in People v. Escarcega,1 criminal charges were finally dis-
missed against the defendants, on a motion made pursuant to Pe-
nal Code section 995.62 The motion was grounded on claims that
the defendants were not properly "confined," since the preliminary
examination was not closed following their section 868 motion.
Many other lower courts have refused to hold the mandatory
closure statute unconstitutional. 3 But members of the media have
mounted an increasing campaign of objections to the statute, in-
sisting that it over-broadly regulates important interests of the
public and press in open proceedings." In addition, the media as-
sert that several other significant issues are raised regarding the
important interests of the public and press in attending criminal
judicial proceedings, including the constitutionally guaranteed
right of a public criminal trial" and the First Amendment interests
of press access to judicial proceedings to gather newsworthy infor-
mation. Also at stake, they insist, is the public interest in an open
court, the public's right to receive information, and its right to a
criminal justice system which operates as fairly and efficiently as
possible."
Even though, owing to its unique news-disseminating function,"
the press may have a more immediate and pressing need than the
public in general to gain access to criminal proceedings, the courts
have consistently refused to recognize a greater need for access by
the press. California courts, for example, have refused to bestow on
members of the press any such special status, saying they are in
filed Oct. 30, 1979); People v. Monty, No. A-142369 (Los Angeles Mun. Ct., Van Nuys Jud.
Dist., filed Jan. 4, 1979).
61. No. A-349035 (Los Angeles Mun. Ct., Los Angeles Jud. Dist., filed April 10, 1979).
62. CAL. PENAL CODE § 995 (West) describes the procedural situations which can lead to
the setting aside, on defendant's motion, of an indictment or information.
63. See People v. Pompa-Ortiz, 27 Cal. 3d 519, 612 P.2d 941, 165 Cal. Rptr. 851; People v.
Parnell, No. 70859A (Alameda Superior Ct., Alameda Jud. Dist., filed Mar. 17, 1980); People
v. Buono, No. A-354231 (Los Angeles Mun. Ct., Los Angeles Jud. Dist., filed Dec. 16, 1979);
People v. Darlin June Cromer, No. 70061 (Alameda Superior Ct., Alameda Jud. Dist., filed
April 18, 1980).
64. High Court Refuses to Review Century-Old Closure Statute, THE NEWS MEDIA AND
THE LAW, Aug./Sept. 1980, at 9.
65. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 100 S. Ct. 2814 (1980).
66. Fenner & Koley, The Rights of the Press and the Closed Court Criminal Proceeding,
57 NEB. L. REV. 442, 444 (1978).
67. See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978). See also text accompanying notes 41-
48 supra.
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the same position as members of the public." Dicta from a Califor-
nia appellate case so holds.69 Three dissenting justices in a recent
U.S. Supreme Court case, however, did recognize what they termed
"the special needs of the press," though the majority felt that reg-
ularly-scheduled tours of a county jail were adequate for the press
as well as the public. 0
B. The Defendant's Interests
On the spectrum of opinion regarding section 868, the defendant
stands at one end, insisting on an absolute right to closure at his
request. The defendant argues that section 868 is an important
means of protecting against the potentially harmful effects of pre-
trial publicity. Indeed, as stated earlier, this was clearly one of the
major purposes the legislature intended in enacting it.7 ' The right
to closure at the preliminary hearing was described in the Elliot
case as "not an insubstantial right" and a "fundamental safe-
guard" protecting the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a
trial by an impartial jury.72 That avoiding prejudice of potential
jurors is the primary purpose of section 868 is demonstrated also
by the fact that once a jury has been chosen and the trial has be-
gun, when there are means other than closure which can be em-
ployed to keep prejudicial information from the jurors," closure is
left to the discretion of the court74 with a strong judicial preference
for openness.7 5 One of the major dangers at which statutes like sec-
tion 868 seem aimed is press access to and publicity about poten-
tially damaging evidence against the defendant which will eventu-
ally be suppressed before trial because of irregularities in its
seizure.76 The statute also serves to protect the defendant in pre-
serving his reputation..A California court of appeal has stated that
"section 868 provides substantial protection to persons unjustifi-
68. See Kirtowsky v. Superior Court, 143 Cal. App. 2d 745, 300 P.2d 163 (1956).
69. Craemer v. Superior Court, 265 Cal. App. 2d 216, 218, 71 Cal. Rptr. 193, 197 (1968).
70. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 32 (1978).
71. See People v. Pompa-Ortiz, 27 Cal. 3d 519, 524-25, 612 P.2d 941, 944, 165 Cal. Rptr.
851, 854 (1980).
72. 54 Cal. 2d 498, 504, 354 P.2d 225, 229, 6 Cal. Rptr. 753, 757 (1960).
73. These include a continuance of the case, change of venue, careful voir dire of prospec-
tive jurors, and in camera hearings on evidence which has potential for prejudicing the jury.
See text accompanying notes 123-32 infra.
74. See People v. Wiley, 57 Cal. App. 3d 149, 166, 129 Cal. Rptr. 13, 24 (1976); People v.
Guy; 191 Cal. App. 2d 714, 719-20, 13 Cal. Rptr. 17, 20 (1961).
75. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia; 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
76. See text accompanying note 52, supra.
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ably accused of a crime, it having specifically conferred on an ac-
cused the right to protect his name from being maligned at a pre-
liminary examination."" This interest, assert defense attorneys
who regularly invoke the protections of section 868 for their cli-
ents, is a substantial one, for publicity of the preliminary hearing
can endanger a defendant's livelihood and relationships even
though no criminal charges are subsequently brought against
him."
C. The Public's Interest in Access
At the other end of the spectrum, and forming the basis of chal-
lenges to section 868 and closure statutes relating to other portions
of the judicial process, is the assumption that the public has a vital
interest in the openness of criminal proceedings. The U.S. Su-
preme Court in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia79 recently
noted:
[The] expressly guaranteed [First Amendment] freedoms share a
common core purpose of assuring freedom of communication on
matters relating to the functioning of government. Plainly it
would be difficult to single out any aspect of government of
higher concern and importance to the people than the manner in
which criminal trials are conducted. 0
A general societal interest in open courts has long been a sub-
stantial consideration in the maintenance of the criminal justice
system. Years ago, the U.S. Supreme Court in In re Oliver"* spoke
of "this nation's historic distrust of secret proceedings, their inher-
ent dangers to freedom." The right to a public trial, while guar-
anteed to the defendant personally via the Sixth Amendment, has
been determined to be based on the principle that "justice cannot
survive behind walls of silence." 3 And if "the citizenry is the final
judge of the proper conduct of public business,"8 4 then it cannot be
denied that the press, in its coverage of judicial proceedings, can
play a particularly important role in insuring that trials are con-
77. People v. Duckett, 210 Cal. App. 2d 867, 870, 26 Cal. Rptr. 926, 927-28 (1962).
78. Interview with Terrence Redmond, practicing attorney in San Francisco, California
(Dec. 22, 1980); The Recorder, Dec. 18, 1980, at 1, col. 1.
.79. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
80. Id. at 575.
81. 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
82. Id. at 273.
83. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 349 (1966).
84. Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 495 (1975).
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ducted fairly.
The opportunity to observe criminal trials and other criminal
proceedings is a significant public interest because it allows the
public to evaluate judicial processes and to scrutinize the conduct
of public and elected officials such as judges, district attorneys, and
public defenders." For the magistrate in California who spends
most of his time presiding over preliminary hearings, section 868
affords the possibility of keeping his courtroom free of public scru-
tiny. The public cannot carry out its duties of making informed,
educated choices at elections of judicial officers if it is not allowed
to observe the functioning of the system in which those officers
participate and have such great influence in shaping. If the public
is, as a matter of inflexible policy, only allowed to observe the trial
itself, there still is much room for the kind of inefficiency, unfair-
ness, and abuse in other proceedings which the concept of open-
ness seeks to prevent; the public's interest in observing or having
press representatives act as watchdogs is subverted whenever an
automatic preference is given to defendants to exclude the public
from criminal proceedings.
In addition, the public and press scrutiny which openness invites
can serve to insure even-handed treatment of the defendant, which
is at the root of the public's interest in seeing that justice is done.
A defendant may benefit as well as suffer from the mistakes and
prejudices of a judge, for there is a potential that the secrecy which
surrounds criminal judicial proceedings can result in either unjus-
tified favoring or unjust prosecution of a defendant."
Another major justification for public access to judicial proceed-
ings is that openness tends to reassure the public, while secrecy
imposed on portions of the proceedings against a defendant creates
or leads to public cynicism, ignorance, or uneasiness about the
criminal justice system - indeed, about government in general.
Particularly in more sensational cases in which a defendant would
most likely invoke section 868, the public's confidence in the crimi-
nal justice system is undermined when judicial decisions and pro-
ceedings are shrouded in secrecy. 7
Thus, while the Sixth Amendment public trial guarantee" is
85. Gannett v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 434-35 (1979) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
86. See Lewis v. Peyton, 352 F.2d 791, 792 (4th Cir. 1965); United States v. Cianfrani, 573
F.2d 835, 853 (3d Cir. 1978).
87. Id.
88. The Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides:
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clearly regarded as a right which inures chiefly to the benefit of the
criminal defendant, it cannot be denied that the public and the
press have an interest in public proceedings. The Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals has said that the public trial guarantee "is not
only to protect the accused but to protect as much the public's
right to know what goes on when men's lives and liberties are at
stake."89 And the Third Circuit recently expressed its conviction
that, "[s]ecret hearings . . . are suspect by nature. Public confi-
dence cannot be maintained where important judicial decisions are
made behind closed doors and announced in conclusive terms to
the public."90 The court further stated that "[s]ince the public trial
requirement is 'for the protection of the public generally' as well as
of the accused," a motion for a private hearing generally includes
consideration of the public's interests as well as the defendant's.
"[A]ny deviation from the constitutionally established norm of
open proceedings implicates important societal interests." 1
Though neither of these federal cases is binding in California, and
while neither attempts to interpret section 868, they do identify
the principles underlying the public's stake in judicial openness.
In addition to the justifications discussed above, there are sev-
eral other more specific and readily identifiable advantages served
by public court proceedings which have been embraced by the
courts in recent years. One of these is the protection against per-
jury of witnesses, the pressure of public scrutiny upon witnesses
which helps to ensure they tell the truth while on the stand." An-
other purpose served by open proceedings is to afford the opportu-
nity to unknown witnesses to step forward with pertinent evi-
dence.9 Again, if the proceedings are conducted in secrecy, there is
no opportunity for those who are not parties to the litigation to
offer helpful evidence or information." In addition, an open court
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
89. Lewis v. Peyton, 352 F.2d 791, 792 (4th Cir. 1965).
90. United States v. Cianfrani, 573 F.2d 835, 851 (3d Cir. 1978).
91. Id. at 852.
92. Id. See also People v. Pompa-Ortiz, 27 Cal. 3d 519, 530, 612 P.2d 941, 947, 165 Cal.
Rptr. 851, 857 (referring specifically to preliminary hearings).
93. 573 F.2d at 852.
94. See note 87, supra.
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serves to facilitate the need to know what goes on in the courtroom
for non-parties who nevertheless have a stake in the litigation and
who would not otherwise have the opportunity to read or hear ac-
counts of the proceeding in the news media.8
IV
Access Extended to Preliminary Hearings
The California 'Supreme Court has called the preliminary hear-
ing a "critical" stage of criminal proceedings," and has said the
denial of such a hearing to an indicted defendant is a deprivation
of fundamental constitutional rights." The preliminary hearing is
used for many purposes,98 but its major purpose is 'to screen out
unfounded charges against a criminal defendant. 9 "The purpose of
the preliminary hearing is to weed out groundless or unsupported
charges of grave offense, and to relieve the accused of the degrada-
tion and expense of a criminal trial."100
Though not a trial on the issue of guilt or innocence, the prelimi-
nary hearing in California in some ways 'resembles a full trial. Oral
95. United States v. Cianfrani, 573 F.2d at 853; Gannett v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 428
(1979).
96. Hawkins v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. 3d 584, 586 P.2d 916, 918, 150 Cal. Rptr. 435, 437
(1978) (quoting Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1970), in which the U.S. Supreme
Court held that a defendant was entitled to counsel at the preliminary hearing stage in
Alabama). The court noted that a "skilled interrogation of witnesses by an experienced law-
yer can fashion a vital impeachment tool for use in cross-examination of the state's wit-
nesses at the trial, or preserve testimony favorable to the accused of a witness who does not
appear at the trial." Id. at 588, 586 P.2d at 918-19, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 437-38.
The U.S. Supreme Court's definition of a "critical stage" has always been somewhat
vague, but in 1975 the Court, holding that a probable cause determination is not a critical
stage, identified "critical stages" as "those pretrial procedures that would impair a defense
on the merits if the accused is required to proceed without counsel." Gerstein v. Pugh, 420
U.S. 103, 122 (1975). A "critical stage" has been defined generally by the Court as the point
at which the "defendant finds himself faced with, the prosecutorial forces of organized soci-
ety, and immersed in the intricacies of substantive and procedural criminal law." Kirby v.
Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972). For other Supreme Court attempts to define the term, see
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967);
United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973).
97. Hawkins v. Superior Court, 22 Cal., 3d 584, 593, 586 P.2d 916, 921, 150 Cal. Rptr. 435,
440 (1978).
98. Graham & Letwin, The Preliminary Hearing in Los Angeles, 18 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 916
(1971). Purposes include that of a discovery device, substitute for a full trial, and a mecha-
nism for determining the legality of detention, among other collateral functions.
99. "The manifest function of the preliminary hearing, and the only one presently viewed
as legitimate, is to eliminate cases that for a variety of reasons ought not to be prosecuted."
Id. at 639-40.
100. Jaffe v. Stone, 18 Cal. 2d 146, 150, 114 P.2d 335, 338 (1941).
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testimony of witnesses may be offered by both sides, though gener-
ally the defendant uses the preliminary hearing as a discovery de-
vice.10 Based on the testimony presented, however, the magistrate,
as the trier of fact, evaluates whether there 'is probable cause to
bind the defendant over for trial in Superior Court.
An accused in California has the right to a timely preliminary
hearing,10 2 at which the presiding judge must inform him of the
extent of the charges against him.'03 At the preliminary hearing,
the defendant has a right to counsel,o'0 and the denial of this right
has been held to be a denial of due process and supportive of a
ruling that a defendant was not legally committed. 05 In addition,
the accused has a statutory right to have witnesses examined in his
presence at the preliminary hearing, and then to have the opportu-
nity to cross-examine them. 06 These rights are fundamental and
constitutionally protected.107
The rights and protections accorded the defendant at the pre-
liminary hearing point out the significance of this stage of criminal
proceedings; it is an event important, not only to the defendant,
but to the public as well. Again, the public has an interest in scru-
tinizing the conduct of officers of the court, as well as the district
attorney, 08 who uses the pretrial hearing to preliminarily establish
a case against the defendant. This is the first opportunity of the
press and public to be present at a judicial proceeding in which
evidence against the defendant is introduced, alluded to or sug-
101. Graham & Letwin, The Preliminary Hearing in Los Angeles, supra note 87, at 658.
Also, the California Supreme Court has recognized the "important discovery function served
by an adversarial preliminary hearing; such a hearing will assuredly provide the defense
with valuable information about the case against the accused, enhancing its ability to evalu-
ate the desirability of entering a plea or to prepare for trial." Hawkins v. Superior Court, 22
Cal. 3d 584, 588, 586 P.2d 916, 919, 150 Cal. Rptr. 435, 440 (1978). The defendant also uses
the hearing as a discovery device to avoid giving the prosecution any information about the
defendant's case. Thus, witnesses are rarely called at this stage as the defense attorney is
still formulating his trial strategy.
102. CA. PENAL CODE § 859(b) (West Supp. 1981): "Both the defendant and the people
have the right to a preliminary examination at the earliest possible time, and unless both
waive that right or good cause for continuance is found . . . the preliminary examination
shall be held within 10 court days of the date of the defendant is arraigned or pleads, which-
ever occurs later."
103. See People v. Stein, 23 Cal. App. 108, 113, 137 P. 271, 273 (1913).
104. See In re Van Brunt, 242 Cal. App. 2d 96, 51 Cal. Rptr. 136 (1966).
105. See People v. Phillips, 229 Cal. App. 2d 496, 40 Cal. Rptr. 403, 409 (1964).
106. CAL. PENAL CODE § 865 (West).
107. See Jennings v. Superior Court, 66 Cal. 2d 867, 428 P.2d 304, 59 Cal. Rptr. 440
(1967).
108. See text accompanying note 79, supra.
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gested. Prior to this, the press has probably had access to the com-
plaint which lists the offenses charged against the defendant but
the complaint would not have contained elaboration about the
charges, including the circumstances surrounding their initia-
tion."' The public and press have also had the opportunity to at-
tend the arraignment, at which time the magistrate informs the
defendant of the charges against him, sets bails, appoints counsel if
none has been retained, and sets the date for a preliminary hear-
ing. However, no testimony is given, nor are any details underlying
the charges provided at this proceeding.110 Further, public interests
other than the scrutiny of officials attach at this stage of the pro-
ceedings. Just as at the trial, the protection against perjury, the
reassurance given to the public when judicial proceedings at all sig-
nificant stages are kept open, and the facilitation of discovery of
unknown witnesses"' all inhere at the preliminary hearing stage.
What transpires at the preliminary hearing becomes even more
important when one considers the large number of cases that never
progress beyond this stage. Of 150,004 felony arrests in California
in 1978, only 3.2% went to trial." 2 Even taking into account guilty
pleas, plea bargains, and dismissals that come before the prelimi-
nary hearing, it is reasonable to assume that a large percent do not
progress beyond the preliminary hearing stage. To shut out the
press and the public at this stage of the proceedings is to cut off
entirely their access to criminal proceedings in the majority of
cases. The press and the public thus lose a significant opportunity
to observe the criminal justice system, and the role of the press as
a "restraint on possible abuse of judicial power""' is weakened
considerably.
V
Pre-Trial Publicity: A Threat to a Fair Trial?
A part of the rationale underlying California's section 868 and
109. C. WHITEBREAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 9-10 (1980).
110. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 976-90 (West).
111. See People v. Pompa-Ortiz, 27 Cal. 3d 519, 530, 612 P.2d 941, 947, 165 Cal. Rptr.
851, 857 (1980).
112. State of California, Dept. of Justice, Division of Law Enforcement, Bureau of Crimi-
nal Statistics, Crime and Delinquency in California, 1978, Part II, at 9-10, Tables 4, 5. This
is an annual report published by the Bureau of Criminal Statistics, presenting data on the
nature and extent of crime and delinquency and the administration of criminal justice in
California.
113. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 (1948).
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the granting of requests to close portions of judicial proceedings is
the assumption that pretrial publicity necessarily poses a signifi-
cant threat to the defendant's right to a trial before an impartial
jury."" For this reason, closure of proceedings is sought, gag orders
are imposed, and attorneys, judges, and other officers of the court
are prohibited from speaking to the press. This assumption, how-
ever, has never been substantiated," and there is evidence from
studies of jury performance, 16 and U.S. Supreme Court dicta"'7
that supports a less absolutist conclusion regarding pretrial
publicity.
Jurors . . . recognize their special role as temporary members of
the judiciary, bound by rules of law and procedures that are for-
eign to their business transactions or informal conversations. Or-
dinary citizens are willing to accept these legal trappings and to
work within them. The fears voiced by critics that jurors make
capricious decisions because of bias, incompetence, and irrelevant
factors have not been substantiated."
One scholar, writing in a symposium on the U.S. Supreme Court
decision Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart,"9 noted: "The law-
yer trying a case involving either a defendant who is extremely
ugly or one who has had the misfortune to be accused by a victim
who radiates saintliness probably will fear the effects of these irra-
114. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (trials); Gannett v.
DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979) (pretrial suppression hearings); People v. Elliot, 54 Cal. 2d
498, 354 P.2d 225, 6 Cal. Rptr. 753 (1960) (preliminary hearings).
115. "Sensible judges and lawyers no longer pretend that a criminal or civil trial can be
conducted in a sterilized courtroom before 12 men and women from whose brains the last
ounce of pretrial information has been strained. . . . [Jiuries have been handing down what
would seem for many to be altogether astounding verdicts. Ms. Angela Davis, the young
black radical and confessed Communist who had been accused of supplying weapons to
radicals to gun down a judge and other hostages while trying to free prisoners, was
acquitted."
"And former Attorney General John Mitchell, one of those who claimed prejudicial pub-
licity, was freed along with Maurice Stans . . . for charges associated with campaign fund-
raising in support of the Watergate case." Before trial, Mitchell's attorneys submitted to the
court a private survey by a pollster showing that 84% of a sampling of people in the District
of Columbia thought him guilty and only 2% thought him innocent. Nevertheless, both
Mitchell and Stans were acquitted. Graham, From the Press, in THE JURY SYSTEM IN
AMERICA 202 (R. Simon ed. 1975).
116. See Simon, Does the Court's Decision in Nebraska Press Association Fit the Re-
search Evidence on the Impact on Jurors of News Coverage? 29 STAN. L. REv. 515, 520-28
(1977).
117. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 551, 554 (1976).
118. See C. WHITEBREAD, supra note 104.
119. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
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tional factors far more than pretrial publicity." 12 0
In Nebraska Press Association"' the Court said that "pretrial
publicity - even pervasive, adverse publicity - does not inevita-
bly lead to an unfair trial." 2 2 The Court based its assertion on
several "sensational" cases in which there was a tension between
the right of the accused to a fair trial and the First Amendment
freedoms of others. The Court held that the capacity of a jury,
even one exposed to hostile publicity about the defendant, to de-
cide a case fairly is influenced by the tone and extent of the public-
ity, which is in turn often shaped by what attorneys, judges, and
other judicial officers do to precipitate news coverage. 22 The Court
further explained that the trial judge can play an important role in
mitigating the effects of damaging pretrial publicity.'"
Scholars and courts agree that the First Amendment interests of
the press and public, and the defendant's Sixth Amendment right
to a fair trial do not necessarily conflict, and one need not always
be sacrificed for the other. Where conduct of the judiciary and the
press during pretrial proceedings poses a genuine threat to a defen-
dant's right to a fair trial, closure may well be in order. The U.S.
Supreme Court in the notorious murder case of Sheppard v. Max-
well' ruled that the impact of pretrial publicity, which included a
three-day televised inquest, was enough to warrant reversal of the
defendant's murder conviction. Even so, the Court noted that the
press is "regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial adminis-
tration, especially in the criminal field. . . . The press does not
simply publish information about trials but guards against the mis-
carriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judi-
cial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism." 2 6
Though the particular "carnival" 2 7 atmosphere of the Sheppard
trial led the Court to find ample threat to the defendant's fair trial
right, it also noted in general that, "[t]his Court has . . . been un-
willing to place any direct limitations on the freedom traditionally
exercised by the news media." "8
120. Kaplan, Of Babies and Bathwater, 29 STAN. L. REv. 621, 624 (1977).
121. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
122. Id. at 554.
123. Id. at 554-55.
124. Id. at 555.
125. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
126. Id. at 350.
127. Id. at 358.
128. Id. at 350.
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VI
Remedies
The issue of whether or not to close a preliminary hearing in
criminal proceedings should be discretionary with the presiding
judge, based on the particular facts of the case and the constitu-
tional rights and interests represented.2 9 Furthermore, because of
the important First Amendment implications of closure, there
should be a burden on the defendant moving for closure to make
some showing that his right to a fair trial is indeed threatened.a0
This burden is further justified by the fact that, while a criminal
defendant has a constitutional right to a public trial, he is not
guaranteed a secret trial simply because he requests it.181 In a re-
cent Michigan Supreme Court case the court espoused this idea,
holding that "[tihe parties may not, by their mere agreement, em-
power a judge to exclude the public and press.""as That holding
129. See Cromer v. Superior Court, 109 Cal. App. 3d 728, 167 Cal. Rptr. 671, 674 (1980).
130. "With such obviously important public interests implicated by exclusion orders,
judges should be required to give full consideration to measures for protecting those inter-
ests while endeavoring to safeguard the rights of the accused. . . . [Ilt will likely be found
that the accused's and the public's rights can be accorded the widest possible latitude with-
out colliding with one another." Comment, Public and Press Access to Pre-Trial Suppres-
sion Hearings, 47 U. Cin. L. Rev. 444, 468 (1978). The defendant should show "that a threat
to a fair trial actually exists, that closure will defeat the threat, and that alternatives to
secrecy are ineffective." Note, The Right to Attend Criminal Hearings, 78 Colum. L. Rev.
1308, 1329 (1978). The degree of certainty required is open to question, but according to the
author it should be at least a reasonable probability. Id. See also Justice Powell's concurring
opinion in Gannett v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 401 (1979). In Gannett Pacific Corp. v.
Richardson, 59 Haw. 224, 233-34, 580 P.2d 49, 57 (1978), the court said: "In determining
whether there is such a likelihood [that an open hearing as to that part of the proceeding
would interfere with the defendant's right to a fair trial by an impartial jury] the district
judge shall consider the nature of the evidence sought to be presented; the probability of
such information reaching potential jurors; the likely prejudicial impact of this information
upon prospective veniremen; and the availability and efficacy of alternative means to neu-
tralize the effect of such disclosures.
131. Gannett v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 382 (1979): "While the Sixth Amendment
guarantees to a defendant in a criminal case the right to a public trial, it does not guarantee
the right to compel a private trial." See also United States v. Cianfrani, 573 F.2d 835, 852
(3d Cir. 1978): "But it is also true . . . that the . . . defendant has no absolute right to
compel a private trial." Gannett Pacific Corp. v. Richardson, 59 Haw. 224, 229, 580 P.2d 49,
58 (1978).
132. Detroit Free Press v. Macomb Circuit Judge, 405 Mich. 544, 275 N.W.2d 482 (1979).
In this case, the Michigan Supreme Court reversed a trial court's decision to exclude the
public and press from a pretrial hearing and subsequent trial because of an agreement be-
tween the prosecutor and the defendant where no reason was given by the defendant for
closure and the trial judge did not investigate the defendant's request. The applicable Mich-
igan statute provided that "the sittings of every court within this state shall be public."
MIcH. COMP. LAWS § 600-1420. The Michigan Supreme Court found the statute had been
disregarded by the judge without justification. The court held the public and press right to
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fully supported the ruling in Gannett v. DePasquale,3 upholding
the trial court's balancing of the defendant's fair trial right against
the public's interest in access to a pretrial suppression hearing."
It is also consistent with a recent California appellate court's asser-
tion that reviewing courts should make an "independent evalua-
tion of the circumstances"3 5 of the cases before them in determin-
ing whether there is a "reasonable likelihood" of substantial
prejudice to a defendant."
This "independent evaluation" should include consideration of
such factors as the nature of the defendant's alleged crime, the na-
ture and extent of publicity regarding the crime and the defen-
dant's arrest, the size of the -population in the area from which
jurors will be picked, and the reach of the news media in the area.
Regarding potential jurors, the trial court should evaluate the
probability that they will read or hear damaging news about the
case, that they will remember and believe what they hear about it,
and whether this is likely to prejudice their ultimate verdict.
Besides the great need for providing for judicial discretion under
a statute allowing the defendant to close his preliminary hearing,
courts should be encouraged to look to alternatives to closure. In
the majority of cases in which the interests of both the public and
the defendant need to be considered, closure or even consideration
of closure will not be necessary. Thus, the trial court should look to
the possible benefits of a careful and searching voir dire of jurors.
In the 1807 trial of Aaron Burr, Chief Justice John Marshall, then
a trial judge, conducted a thorough voir dire to eliminate the possi-
bility of a biased jury in that celebrated case. Marshall's careful
inquiry into the possibility of bias would be a viable solution in
attend judicial hearings and trials in criminal cases is not absolute, but also held that mere
agreement between the parties to exclude the public is insufficient justification for closure.
The court ruled that when a closure motion is made, the trial court should, at a minimum,
"take testimony at a hearing open to all interested parties, explore the constitutional and
statutory validity of any profferred justifications for excluding the public and press from
any portion of the trial, and determine whether any alternative and less restrictive mecha-
nisms exist." Id. at 549, 275 N.W.2d at 484.
133. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
134. Id. at 392-93.
135. Cromer v. Superior Court, 109 Cal. App. 3d 728, 734, 167 Cal. Rptr. 671, 674 (1980).
136. Id. at 733-34. "The appropriate judicial criteria for insuring an accused a fair trial in
the face of adverse pretrial publicity is whether there is a 'reasonable likelihood' of substan-
tial prejudice (Brian W. v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal. 3d 618, 624, fn. 7 [citations]) or
that 'publication of [a pretrial] transcript would endanger [defendant's] right to a fair trial'
(Rosato v. Superior Court, supra, 51 Cal. App. 3d 190, 209), or that there is 'identifiable
prejudice to the accused' (People v. Sirhan, supra, 562 Cal. 3d 710, 731)."
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many cases today."'
In regard to potentially inadmissable evidence which will later
be suppressed at trial due to irregularities in its seizure, the defen-
dant's interests must be safeguarded with utmost care. For this
reason, it would be wise to conduct that limited portion of the pre-
liminary hearing in which this evidence is discussed in camera, but
this should only be done after the defendant makes a showing of
substantial likelihood that the evidence might be suppressed.
Such alternatives as continuance of a case until public interest
subsides, or transfer to another location not as closely connected
with the crime or permeated with publicity about it, 38 are still
other avenues for the trial court to pursue when the defendant
fears that his fair trial right is threatened by an open hearing. For
the defendant who insists that the publicity created by an open
preliminary hearing is harmful to his reputation, there is a civil
remedy-the defamation action. This seems an adequate remedy
when solicitude of the' defendant's reputation interest during crim-
inal proceedings hinders full exercise of fundamental First Amend-
ment interests.
A Model Statute
Arizona's closure statute is an appropriate model for comparison
or duplication. It contains a presumption of openness, but also
contains safeguards for insuring the defendant his fair trial right:
All proceedings shall be open to the public, including representa-
tives of the news media, unless the court finds, upon application
of the defendant, that an open proceeding presents a clear and
present danger to the defendant's right to a fair trial by an im-
partial jury.139
The trial court should also consider whether there are alternatives
to closure which would adequately protect the defendant's fair
trial right while allowing access to the public and representatives
of the news media.
137. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 548 (1976).
138. But see Brian W. v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 618, 625, 573 P.2d 788, 791, 143 Cal.
Rptr. 717, 721 (1978). The Court said while these are possible alternatives, they are not
"entirely satisfactory . . . as they may indirectly affect the defendant's right to a speedy
trial in the district in which the crime was committed."
139. AMz. R. CaRm. P. 9.3(b).
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VII
Conclusion
While "[c]losed pretrial proceedings have been a familiar part of
the judicial landscape in this country,"14 0 to protect the defendant
from prejudicial pretrial publicity, there is little legal authority or
statistical data to suggest that a defendant's fair trial right is nec-
essarily threatened by an open preliminary hearing. California Pe-
nal Code section 868, however, sweepingly regulates the First
Amendment interests of the press and public in attending prelimi-
nary hearings, and in its inflexibility truncates press access to an
important portion of criminal proceedings without proper
justification.
Because of the judiciary's crucial role in insuring that a defen-
dant's constitutional rights are not violated, it is recommended
that the magistrate be allowed to exercise discretion in responding
to a defendant's request for closing the preliminary hearing. This
discretion should be based on an initial showing by the defendant
that publicity and openness of the hearing are likely to threaten
his right to a fair trial. Magistrates could be directed statutorily to
consider the particular circumstances of each case, giving full at-
tention to the important First Amendment interests of the public
and press. Further, in weighing all the factors, magistrates could be
instructed to consider the alternatives available to provide protec-
tion to the defendant's rights such as continuance, change of
venue, a searching voir dire, and an in camera hearing on poten-
tially inadmissable evidence. It may well be, when a showing of
substantial threat is made by the defendant and there appears to
be no effective safeguard for the defendant's fair trial right, that
closure would be warranted. A provision as one-sided as section
868 manifests no cognizance of the times when such a drastic mea-
sure is not only unnecessary for the defendant's protection, but
also gives insufficient attention to the First Amendment interests
of the public and press. The public interest in access to prelimi-
nary hearings remains constant and vital. As long as section 868 is
sanctioned by the California courts and the courts of other states,
the press's role as the "handmaiden of effective judicial adminis-
tration,""' will be restrained and the public's access to informa-
140. Gannett v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 390 (1979).
141. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966).
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tion about the workings of the criminal justice system will be un-
necessarily blocked.

